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Honeypots are a well-known concept used for threat intelligence
and are becoming more ordinary within ICS environments. A well-
known ICS honeypot, Conpot, is popular and has been deployed
on a large scale. These deployments are not always correctly con-
figured and have odd characteristics compared to a real industrial
control system. This paper explores several common Conpot signa-
tures and deployments found through internet search engines such
as Shodan. We identify that the default deployment of Conpot is not
enough when deploying a honeypot. Afterwards, we explore the
behaviour of a real PLC when conducting the same reconnaissance
operations. To verify these red flags, we deploy three honeypots
with a different configuration, have them scanned by Shodan and
evaluate the traffic they get. Our experiments indicate that Shodan
leverages CIP for ICS classification. We conclude that proper de-
ployment of a low-interaction honeypot, such as Conpot, requires
time and resources to entirely obfuscate the device and fool the
attacker to a limited level. However, small changes to the default
configuration does increase the performance of Conpot and results
in more returning traffic.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Honeypots are an interesting security concept; instead of keeping
attackers out, you want to invite them in [17]. The recent move
towards Internet-connected Industrial Control Systems (ICS) [1]
brings honeypots to those specialised networks as well. There have
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been a large number of attacks on critical infrastructure that have
had vast implications and have evolved over time to a point where
nation-states are one of the main threats in current days. Unlike tra-
ditional IT infrastructure, these devices have a specific function and
are deployed in unique environments. These and other ICS specific
characteristics affect the required security measures as well. Their
highly specialised function requires an attacker to have knowledge
about the operation of these devices to exploit them successfully.
This can be seen as in recent times ICS and critical environments
are being targeted by nation-states [9]. On another side, these de-
vices are not part of the typical organisational infrastructure but are
instead deployed by specific sectors and in distinct environments,
which a honeypot must successfully replicate [12].
They are commonly classified into two, and sometimes three,
types: Low-, (medium-) and high-interaction. The difference be-
tween these types lies in the deployment, maintenance and, most im-
portant, data capturing capabilities. Generally speaking, the higher
the level of interaction, the more data the honeypot can capture[16].
This is because a high-interaction honeypot is, in essence, the same
system as would be running in the operational environment but
with the addition of monitoring systems such as host and network
intrusion detection systems. Therefore, high-interaction variants
are less likely to be identified as honeypots [6]. Within the ICS en-
vironment, these differences are even more important. As attackers
are generally more knowledgeable, they could easily spot anomalies
within the honeypot. Automated attacks would also be interrupted
as they would not receive the appropriate response [13], which is
easily built-in a script. Therefore, a honeypot needs to resemble a
real system as closely as possible.
Further, due to their critical functions, any attack can have sig-
nificant effects. However, from a security perspective, legitimate
requests should not be blocked as that can have an equally dan-
gerous effect. Therefore we need to find a balance. Honeypots can
aid in this as they can try to redirect malicious requests to those
systems instead of the operational infrastructure and provide us
with threat intelligence to be used in other security measures.
This paper investigates the deployment of Conpot honeypots
and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of these deployments.
Further, we use well-known Internet scanners to scan the Internet
for ICS infrastructure and honeypots. We utilise this data to provide
an overview of the differences between real devices and Conpot
honeypots. These weaknesses result in red flags for attackers tar-
geting ICS systems and should divert them from these honeypots.
Scanners such as Shodan, and its Honeyscore, should be able to
pick up on these discrepancies [13].
The core contributions of this paper are:
• Evaluating the default Conpot in relation to a real PLC
ICSS 2021, December 7, 2021, Austin, TX Maesschalck, et al.
• Improving upon the default Conpot configuration
• Providing background into Shodan discovery of ICS devices
• Presenting an overview of misconfigured Conpot deploy-
ments on the Internet
The remainder of this paper is structured as followed. Section 2
of this paper explores the concept of ICS honeypots and introduces
Conpot, a well-known honeypot, alongside other examples. The
next section investigates the default configuration of Conpot and
compares this to the interaction a real PLC provides for attackers. In
section 4 we aim to improve upon the default Conpot configuration
by deploying a default Conpot and two additional Conpots with
a changed configuration within our Cyber Threat Lab. We verify
these changes by evaluating the traffic to these deployments and
their discovery by Shodan. Afterwards, section 5.2 delves into real
Conpot honeypots deployed on the Internet, which we found via
Shodan, Censys and ZoomEye, and the inconsistencies with real
systems. Section 6 concludes the paper and section 7 proposes
future research possibilities.
2 BACKGROUND
Honeypots have been used successfully for years within traditional
IT environments; however, they are still not common within real
ICS environments. The benefits of honeypots have been proven
extensively. Sochor and Zuzack [15] have deployed several Dion-
aea honeypots, which are designed to capture malware and one
Kippo honeypot, which emulates SSH. They have received over
10,000 connections to their Kippo deployment originating from
India, China, Russia and other countries. The Dionaea deployments
received more than 1,000,000 connections, of which more than 200
000 distributedmalware. Zhuge et al. [21] used high-interactive hon-
eypots to collect autonomous spreading malware, which collected
thousands of binaries. Honeypots can indeed provide a wealth of
data, although there are also risks attached to their deployment.
Especially high interaction honeypots can be compromised [2] and
used as an attack vector within the network. The key to obtaining
valuable data lies in the proper configuration and deployment of
the honeypot.
Due to the nature of low-interaction honeypots, they tend to be
easier to identify. A study analysing the fingerprintability of GasPot
concluded there are generalisable fingerprinting schemes [20]. There
are several issues that aremore linked to the nature of low-interaction
honeypots, but others can be easily avoided. An Automatic Tank
Gauging devices running on an IP address owned by Digital Ocean
is strange. Not changing default configurations leaves traces that
knowledgeable hackers will identify. These are two examples of
clear misconfigurations that should not happen. Further, discrepan-
cies such as increased delay can also have an effect on the believ-
ability of the honeypot [18]. One simple spelling error can lead to
the attacker identifying the honeypot [10].
One of the most popular low-interaction ICS honeypots is Con-
pot [11], which is capable of mimicking a range of devices. Further,
Conpot can be reconfigured to fit the purpose of the honeypot better.
Through a search for Conpot deployments, we can see that there
has been a wide range of studies that deployed Conpot in different
environments. There have been other low-interaction honeypots
such as SCyPH [5] and Mimepot [3]. We can see that SCyPH is
promising but lacks to emulate all functions of ICS devices properly.
Mimepot does use SDN to redirect malicious traffic to the honeypot
and provides the attackers with responses to their requests; this
reduces the chances of the honeypot being discovered. However,
the study did not include a thorough evaluation.
3 DEFAULT CONFIGURATION
3.1 Setup
To have a baseline configuration to assess Conpot, we deploy a
default Conpot configurationwithin a lab environment. This is done
on an Ubuntu 20.04 machine. Further, we deploy a real Siemens S7-
300 PLC within the Lancaster ICS lab [7] in its basic configuration.
To verify the behaviour of both devices we utilise Snap7, which is
a library for interfacing with Siemens S7 PLC.
3.2 Methodology
To evaluate the obfuscation capabilities of Conpot, we investigate
how we can differentiate the default Conpot configuration from the
default configuration of a real PLC. We will be looking for common
signatures of Conpot and discrepancies in services running on the
device. To assess both systems from a reconnaissance phase, we will
be running several NMAP scans. The first NMAP scan is an adapted
slow comprehensive scan (nmap -sS -sU -T4 -A -v -PE -PP -PS80,443
-PA3389 -PU40125 -PY -g 53 –script "default or (discovery and safe)"
IP-ADDR), a normal intense scan (nmap -T4 -A -v IP-ADDR) and a
scan targeted on port 102 (nmap -sS -sU -p 102 -T4 -A -v -PE -PP
IP-ADDR). Afterwards, we will run a Snap7 script, attempting to
establish a connection, upload a data block and retrieve the CPU
info.
3.3 Conpot
When looking at the services running on a Conpot deployment,
we can see FTP running on port 21, S7 on port 102, Modbus on
port 502, TFTP on port 69, BACnet on port 47808 and in the default
configuration, a web page running on port 80. The OS detection
scan guesses three Linux distributions with 96% probability and
five other Linux distributions with either 94% or 95% probability.
Port 21 shows a default FTP server running. The webpage (Figure 1)
running on port 80 contains many references to Conpot, such as
’Technodrome’ and ’Last-Modified: Tue, 19 May 1993 09:00:00 GMT’.
S7 is one of the most important services for this Conpot deployment.
However, the built-in s7-info script fails execution, which might be
due to the emulator not supporting all functions. SNMP, running
on port 161, is identified as pysnmp and lists Siemens, SIMATIC,
S7-200 as system description. We can already see multiple failures
within the default Conpot configuration that have to be resolved to
properly obfuscate the honeypot.
Attempting to connect to the Conpot, we can successfully es-
tablish a TCP connection and a further COTP connection. Both
of these messages get an acknowledgement. However, when we
request data from the device, there is no response. Querying the
device for CPU info results in a TCP: Connection Timed Out excep-
tion, as does sending a request to upload a data block. This leads us
to think that there is no real environment connected to the device
and would be a red flag to attackers.
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Figure 1: Default Conpot Web Page
3.4 PLC
When interacting with real PLC systems, we see a similar result
within the NMAP scans. Unlike with the Conpot honeypots, of
which NMAP consistently guesses Linux as one of the possible
operating systems, real PLC systems provide a more mixed result.
With one of the real PLCs, NMAP guesses Thomson TG712 DSL
Router, Microsoft Xbox game console, HP PSC 2400-series printer
and Wyse ThinOS 6 as possible operating systems with 90% or
higher possibility. From this result, it is clear that NMAP does not
have extensive experience with PLC systems and their specialised
operating systems.
A Comprehensive NMAP scan further affirms that NMAP can-
not determine the exact OS. A more in-depth port-specific scan
reveals the iso-tsap service with version Siemens S7 PLC running
on port 102. Further specific information gives a module serial num-
ber, version, system name and copyright saying "Original Siemens
Equipment". Retrieving this data on a known Conpot system re-
sulted in an error. There are no indications that this system might
be a honeypot. Further, another real PLC gives us a dashboard (Fig-
ure 2) when interacting with it, which is very different from the
Conpot page. This allows us to gain more information about the
network and device; this is not available on a Conpot system.
If we send the same pattern of messages as we did with the Con-
pot deployment: a TCP connection followed by a COTP connection
and a data request, we get more information. The first two messages
get the same response as with the honeypot, but if we request data,
then we do get a response from the PLC. We also receive a response
when asking the device for information on its CPU. When we try
to upload a data block, an exception is thrown stating the function
is not authorised for the current protection level. This shows that
the PLC is managing another device, or there is at least simulated
data on the system. However, based on all the other characteristics,
there is no clear indication of a simulated environment.
4 IMPROVING CONPOT CONFIGURATION
From looking at the Conpot configuration files, we can immediately
see that the S7Comm implementation is limited. Nine of the eleven
requests listed result in a ’request_not_implemented’ exception.
Within those nine requests, we can find read, write, download and
upload. These are basic requests for any PLC; not implementing
these results in a severe lack of features.
To improve upon the Conpot configuration it is important to
determine the purpose of the honeypot. This includes reducing the
protocols that are emulated, such as (T)FTP, and aiming to enable
Figure 2: Siemens Simatic 300 Dashboard
the protocols generally seen with a real PLC deployment. Although
every protocol can improve upon the data collection of Conpot,
there can also flaws in the emulation as they do not respond as
expected. Another fault we see on several deployments is the SSH
service that is sometimes running on the honeypot, which both
NMAP and Shodan identify as the Ubuntu version of SSH as it stems
from the operating system. In regards to the HTTP service, it is
vital to change the appropriate configuration files before deploying
the honeypot. This configuration file includes all of the common
signatures we have listed beforehand.
4.1 Experiment
We verify these changes by deploying three Conpot honeypots
(Table 1) within our threat lab and aim for them to get scanned
by Shodan. The first of these honeypots is the default Conpot tem-
plate with SSH disabled. For the second deployment, we disable
SSH, (T)FTP and change all the common signatures from the HTTP
service, which will help us determine the importance of the com-
mon signatures for Shodan to identify a Conpot honeypot. This
way the honeypot does not bear any signs of signatures such as
’Technodrome’, or the default last modified date. The last honeypot
has only the S7Comm emulation is activated to replicate a Siemens
PLC running only S7Comm.






S7Comm ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 1: Overview of Conpot Deployments
We ran all three honeypots twice within our threat lab, once
over a 54 day period and once over a 47 day period. During the
first experiment we received a combined total of 627 connections
over all deployments. Of those connections, there were 308 (49.1%)
distinct IP addresses. Overall, Conpot 1 received 257 connections
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Figure 3: Total Connections for eachHoneypot - First Period
Figure 4: IP Addresses only seen on one Honeypot - First Pe-
riod
(166 distinct), Conpot 2 received 367 connections (227 distinct), and
Conpot 3 received 6 connections (4 distinct) (Figure 3). From this
overview, we can see the deployment with only S7 received the
least connections by far, and the deployment where we obfuscated
the default Conpot deployment received the most. The Conpot 2
deployment received more than one third more connections than
Conpot 1, making it the most popular honeypot by a significant
margin. Looking at the unique IP addresses that only scan one
honeypot in Figure 4 we can see a slight difference between Conpot
1 and Conpot 2. However, Conpot 2 did receive a significant amount
of returning IPs.
The second period of data collection saw a total of 1151 connec-
tions over all deployed honeypots. Of those there were 560 (48.7%)
Figure 5: Total Connections for each Honeypot - Second Pe-
riod
distinct IP addresses. Across all deployments, Conpot 1 received the
most connections with 632 total (303 distinct), Conpot 2 received the
second most connections with 491 total (240 distinct) and Conpot 3
came in with 28 total connections (17 distinct) (Figure 5). Similar
to the first period we ran these honeypots, Conpot 3 received the
least connections by far. However, it received significantly more
connections compared to the Conpot 3 from the first experiment.
Unlike previously, Conpot 2 received less activity than Conpot 1.
The main reason for this is the 163 (T)FTP connections seen by
Conpot 1. When we only look at the shared protocols between Con-
pot 1 and Conpot 2, Conpot 1 has 469 connections which puts it
slightly behind Conpot 2. Overall, Conpot 1 and Conpot 2 received
a similar amount of connections on the shared protocols with only
CIP and MODBUS showing a slight difference in favour of Conpot
2. Looking at the IP addresses that are only seen in one honeypot
as shown in Figure 6, Conpot 2 (164) received slightly more than
Conpot 1 (139) but again has a significantly higher amount of those
that are returning (369 vs. 208). Conpot 3 received 1 IP that is not
seen by another honeypot, that IP was not seen multiple times.
Throughout both experiment, two honeypots were discovered
by Shodan, Conpot 1 and Conpot 2. The time when both honeypots
is differnt within both periods. Within the first period the time of
discovery differs between both, with Conpot 1 being discovered
after 35 days and Conpot 2 being discovered after 45 days. Addition-
ally, Conpot 1 was discovered without any further flags, whereas
Conpot 2 was discovered and flagged as an Industrial Control Sys-
tem. Looking at the average daily connections between all three
deployments (Figure 7 & Figure 8), we can see Conpot 1 saw a
significant increase in activity after discovery, whereas Conpot 2
saw a decline of 35%. The time of and way of Shodan discovery over
both deployments differed. Conpot 1 was scanned by Shodan over
FTP and HTTP protocols, whereas Conpot 2 saw scans on HTTP
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Figure 6: IP Addresses only seen on one Honeypot - Second
Period
and CIP (Common Industrial Protocol) protocols. Conpot 3 saw no
scans from Shodan.
During the second period, both Conpot 1 and Conpot 2 were
discovered quickly. With Conpot 1 being scanned on the CIP pro-
tocol after 1 day and Conpot 2 being scanned on the CIP protocol
after 2 days. This was not the only difference between both ex-
periments, as this time Conpot 1 was also flagged as an ICS. Due
to the quick discovery the comparison between the average daily
connections before and after discovery is not as interesting. The
daily connections itself however is. As we can see in Figure 9, the
connections do not drop to zero anymore on Conpot 1 but are more
stable. Compared to the first period, Conpot 1 was also scanned
over the CIP, BACnet and TFTP. The only protocol that saw no
Shodan scans on Conpot 1 and Conpot 2 in this second period was
S7comm. Conpot 3 did not receive any Shodan scans.
Overall, we can see a wide variety in connections on each pro-
tocol (Figure 10 & Figure 11). During the first period we can see
BACnet (33%) and CIP (31%) being the most popular and HTTP
(19%) coming in third. Looking a the second period, BACnet (24%)
and CIP (36%) are still the most popular, with HTTP (18%) again
coming in third. However, Conpot 1 saw the most connections over
(T)FTP during the first period, but saw the most activity on CIP
during the second. For Conpot 2, CIP is the most popular during
the second period with BACnet coming second with a significant
difference, whereas the first period saw BACnet being the most
popular with CIP being slightly behind. Conpot 3 received the
most S7 connections of all three deployments during both experi-
ments. When looking at the IP addresses scanning each protocol,
we observed during both experiments that each IP only scans one
protocol. This can indicate we mainly got internet scanners that
scan one protocol with each address. During the first period, 74
(24%) of the unique IP-addresses that targeted our systems belong
Figure 7: Average Daily Connections before and After
Shodan Discovery - First Period
Figure 8: Daily Connections for eachHoneypot - First Period
to Censys, this seems to support that statement further. Another
26% of unique IPs belonged to cloud provider Digital Ocean, which
makes it difficult to assess who is behind these requests. For the
second period, 81 (21.2%) of the 382 unique IP-addresses belong to
Censys and 78 (20.4%) belong to Digital Ocean.
4.2 Results
Looking back at the activity we have seen on all three Conpot
deployments over both periods, there are several conclusions we
can make. The main goal of the experiments was to improve upon
the default Conpot configuration. Given that Conpot 2 received
significantly more traffic than the default configuration in the first
period and of the IP-addresses that only targeted one honeypot it
had a considerable more returning connections during both periods,
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Figure 9: Daily Connections for each Honeypot - Second Pe-
riod
we have achieved this goal. Disabling (T)FTP and changing the
default signatures on HTTP resulted in more activity on protocols
linked to ICSs (BACnet, CIP).With regards to S7comm the difference
was very small at both experiments. Therefore, we are reluctant
to draw a conclusion on S7comm connections. All these factors
combined make a strong case that our Conpot 2 deployment is
a significant improvement upon the default configuration. Sadly,
we saw not a lot of activity on the Conpot 3 deployment in order
to draw a conclusion on its effectiveness. However, during both
periods it received the most connections on the S7comm protocol,
with a relatively big difference during the second experiment. The
lack of traffic can be the result of several factors, including not a lot
of activity looking for S7comm protocols in general, as we did not
see a lot of S7comm connections on other deployments. Further, we
acknowledge that the deployment on a university-owned IP-address
range can have an impact on attracting real ICS adversaries.
Another goal of this experiment was to have our deployments
scanned and indexed by Shodan. As two of our honeypots were
indexed twice, we can claim to have achieved this goal. More inter-
estingly, Conpot 2 was discovered and flagged as an ICS both times,
whereas Conpot 1 was only flagged as an ICS during the second
period. This seems to be because Conpot 1 was not scanned on the
CIP during the first experiment. During the second period both
Conpot 1 and Conpot 2 were also scanned on BACnet, which they
were not during the first period. Neither the first or second period
saw Shodan scans on MODBUS. Because the first scan before the
honeypots being classified as ICS happened over the CIP protocol,
and the first period did not see any BACnet scans, they had to have
been identified over CIP. This further believes us to think CIP is
used by shodan to classify ICS devices, but that does not conclude
it is the only protocol Shodan uses. As none of our systems were
classified as honeypots, more can be done to improve upon hon-
eypot detection, especially the limited behaviour of the protocols
can be utilised for this. Looking at the connections Shodan made to
both honeypots, we can see Conpot 1 received both FTP and HTTP
connections during the first period and (T)FTP, HTTP, BACnet
and CIP during the second. Conpot 2 received scans on HTTP and
CIP during the first period, and CIP, BACnet and HTTP during the
second. We set out that discovery by Shodan would result in an
increase in traffic to the honeypot. Although this is the case for
Conpot 1, which saw a substantial increase in connections, Conpot
2 saw a decline in average traffic per day after discovery during
the first experiment. One caveat we have to make with this is that
Conpot 1 was discovered by Shodan 10 days before Conpot 2, which
could skew the data slightly. Due to the quick Shodan discovery
in the second period we cannot infer any trend from that dataset.
In research done by Bodenheim [4] activity did not increase after
indexing in Shodan. In our data we observe both an increase and
slight decrease during the first period. However, given Conpot 1 did
receive zero activity over a period of time until indexed by Shodan
during the first test but did receive constant activity during the
second test we can make a preliminary conclusion it does increase
activity.
Overall, we can see that even slight improvements upon the
default Conpot configuration can lead to an increase in traffic to
the honeypot its ICS related protocols. Getting attackers to return
and keep interacting with the honeypot is important to obtain good
threat intelligence.
5 CONPOT DEPLOYMENTS ON THE
INTERNET
Looking at our research into Conpot deployments we can establish
that low-interaction honeypots such as Conpot provide a limited
amount of data to investigate and are generally incapable of pre-
senting themselves convincingly as a real system. There is a clear
improvement when low-interaction honeypots are deployed in a
more realistic or as part of a realistic environment. Further, we
can see that high-interaction honeypots gather significantly more
useful data [8, 14]. However, across interaction levels, we can see
that the deployment of the honeypot plays a vital role in the success
of the honeypot.
5.1 Methodology
To better understand Conpot deployments connected to the Internet,
we have used popular Internet scanners to find ICS devices. We
will investigate several of the systems returned by Shodan, Cencys
and ZoomEye. Unlike Cencys and ZoomEye, Shodan does identify
systems as honeypots within the results. This is one of the methods
to determine if a system is a honeypot easily. Aside from this, wewill
be investigating common signatures of Conpot and discrepancies
from a real PLC device.
5.2 Results
When investigating the PLC devices that can be found through
Shodan, we can immediately see some honeypots that are wrongly
configured. Hundreds of honeypots are found with one or more
World Wide ICS Honeypots: A Study into the Deployment of Conpot Honeypots ICSS 2021, December 7, 2021, Austin, TX
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Figure 11: Protocol Connections per Deployment - Second Period
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PLC name: Technodrome 319
Plant identification: Mouser Factory 319
Serial number of module: 88111222 336
Last-Modified: 187Tue, 19 May 1993 09:00:00 GMT (HTTP)
Table 2: Common Conpot Signatures on Shodan
Organisation Amount










88111222 & port:102 348
Tue, 19 May 1993 09:00:00 GMT & port:102 244
Table 4: Common Conpot Signatures on Censys
default Conpot configurations. These include the name ’Techn-
odrome’, ’Mouser Factory’ as plant information and a serial number
of ’88111222’ (Table 2). Some of the PLCs are also deployed on
Digital Ocean, a well-known cloud provider, several IP addresses
related to the University of Maryland, Nippon Telegraph and Tele-
phone (NTT), and Amazon AWS IP addresses (Table 3). Aside from
NTT, none of these organisations would not generally deploy a
PLC on their network; particularly cloud deployment is unseen. For
an experienced attacker, any of these signatures should be a red
flag. In the case of The University of Maryland, we get 119 results
when searching for Modbus devices within one of their network
ranges (129.2.27.0/24).
Some organisations do change some parts of the default configu-
ration but still leave obvious red flags on the system. One of these
examples can be seen in Figure 12, which is a Conpot honeypot
deployed in Poland hosted by OVH ISP. We can see they changed
the PLC name on the webpage but failed to change the information
linked to the FTP service running on port 21. The FTP server still
shows ’Technodrome’ and ’Mouser Factory’, which is a clear sign
of a Conpot deployment. We can also see some deployments from
the Australian Academic and Research Network, where the TCP
server also still contains clear indications of a Conpot honeypot.
In Table 4, we can see that Censys produces a similar result
when searching for these common signatures. However, when us-
ing ZoomEye (Table 5), these results are significantly increased.




Serial Number: 88111222 & port:102 1015
Last-Modified: Tue, 19 May 1993 09:00:00 GMT 3442
Table 5: Common Conpot Signatures on ZoomEye
both Censys and Shodan. As it focuses on the discovery of ICS de-
vices [19], it might find more than others, but further investigation
has to be done to find the reason for this discrepancy.
It is clear that these Conpot deployments we have found are
not representing real PLC devices. They are wrongly configured
and easy to spot. We, therefore, are sceptical about their usefulness.
There are quite a few common Conpot signatures, and these are
scattered across the honeypot. We can see in Figure 12 that even
though there was an attempt to obfuscate the honeypot, there were
still common signatures found in other parts of the configuration,
such as the FTP server. Going to a non-existing web page also gives
an error referring to Linux Apache. The slightest hint to one of
these signatures should be a red flag for any attacker. However,
these deployments might still capture automated scans and attacks.
However, we believe that even these attacks could quickly check
the deployment for honeypot signatures or check if Shodan has it
categorised as a honeypot. To mitigate these common signatures,
the default template should not be used or should be reconfigured
to mitigate these shortcomings.
6 CONCLUSION
We can see that there are many inconsistencies between a default
Conpot deployment and an actual PLC device. The honeypot we
have investigated should have raised many questions to real at-
tackers. For one, there are a lot of common Conpot signatures,
which should have been obfuscated before deployment. There are
many references to the actual operating system of the device, Linux,
which will put off any knowledgeable attacker. Deployments such
as these would not provide valuable threat intelligence to the or-
ganisation deploying them. If an attacker were to attack a similar
deployment, they would notice that no data is returned when re-
quested, although a connection can be set up.
For a Conpot deployment or any low-interaction ICS honeypot,
there are many obstacles to overcome. Due to the simulated envi-
ronment, there is a general lack of interaction. This does extend
to the operating system, which is a major red flag for any attacker.
ICSs are hosted with specific hardware and are situated within
environments that the general population does not generally inter-
act with. Because of this, an attacker that would typically target
these environments would be knowledgeable and able to spot these
inconsistencies. The rise of search engines as Shodan only increases
the importance of obfuscation of the honeypot, as once it is classi-
fied as a honeypot, the system would see less valuable interactions.
Our own experiments showed that our slightly obfuscated Conpot
deployment received more connections on ICS-related protocols
and more returning traffic. In contrast, the default Conpot received
many connections over (T)FTP, with (T)FTP being the most and
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Figure 12: Example of Obfuscation Attempt
second most popular protocol in the first and second experiment,
respectively. We also established Shodan leverages CIP as one of
the protocols to identify a system as an ICS, but does not perform
an in-depth scan that identified any of our discovered systems as a
honeypot.
With the inclusion of Shodan within NMAP, it becomes even
more important for honeypots to be configured appropriately. It
is easy for attackers to detect Conpot within their NMAP scan, a
default step in the reconnaissance phase. Further integration with
and improvement of Shodan should provide even more information
and makes the discovery of many honeypots even easier. We believe
that for proper obfuscation of a low-interaction ICS honeypot, a
lot of time and resources would have to be spent to simulate an
actual device accurately. Nevertheless, fooling a real attacker that
is targeting ICSs, remains unlikely through a low-interaction ICS
honeypot. We would recommend a high-interactive variant to gain
the most valuable data.
7 FUTUREWORK
Whenwe compare results for commonConpot signatures on Shodan,
Censys and ZoomEye, we noticed that the latter one returned a lot
more results. Further investigation into the reason for this should
be done. Although we have identified some inconsistencies between
several Conpot deployments and a real PLC, we have not investi-
gated appropriate adjustments to mitigate these. The creation of
proper guidelines for the deployment of ICS honeypots would be
beneficial for any future honeypot deployments.
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